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may be peripheral or merely one of several co-operative forces."0 It
may now be questioned whether a further development of the "state
inaction" concept together with the concept of "peripheral state
action" could result in federal prosecution of private individuals
under section 241 by finding that a state's allowing or failing to pre-
vent a violation of the equal protection clause rights is state action in
violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Regardless of the answer to this question, the separate opinions of
the Court may make moot the entire issue. A majority of the justices
agreed that Congress may, pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, s" legislate to punish all conspiracies, with or without
state action, that interfere with fourteenth amendment rights."2 Thus,
as a result of Guest, it is now possible that Congress may provide for
federal control or supervision of many types of activity which would
involve interference by private individuals, previously thought to be
beyond the powers of the federal government."
Steve Salch
Reviewing Denied Motion for Summary Judgment -
Remand or Rendition of Judgment by Appellate Court
I. ACKERMAN V. VORDENBAUM'
Ernestine Vordenbaum brought an action in trespass to try title
and, in the alternative, to set aside a deed executed by her to the
defendant, Milton Ackermann. The plaintiff's motion for summary
s See text and authorities supra notes 42-48.
81 "The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
sa In Guest a majority of the Court expressed the opinion that, pursuant to § 5 of the
fourteenth amendment, Congress may, in its discretion, statutorily provide for punishment
of private conspiracies to deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws, despite the
lack of state action. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 761 (1966) (concurring opinion
of Clark, J.); Id. at 774 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Three
members of the Court stated further that § 241 is legislation under § 5 and reaches private
conspiracies even though no state action is involved in the conspiracy. United States v. Guest,
383 U.S. 745, 774 (1966) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Cf.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649-51 (1966).
"aThis ramification of Guest has not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., Time, Sept. 23, 1966,
p. 76; New York Times, Sept. 14, 1966, p. 42, col. 3. As to possible limitations on this power,
Mr. Justice Goldberg noted that the social rights of man should not be confused with his
civil rights. Thus the constitution protects privacy and the choice of friends and business
partners on the basis of personal prejudice so that social equality could never be imposed
under any constitutional theory. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 286, 312-13 (1964)
(separate opinion of Goldberg, J.).
1403 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1966).
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judgment was overruled. The defendant then moved to strike the
plaintiff's second amended original petition for failure to comply
with rules relating to supplemental and amended petitions.! After six
months delay, the court granted the motion, and the suit was later
dismissed on the defendent's motion for lack of prosecution. The
court of civil appeals reversed the dismissal and rendered judgment
for the plaintiff, finding that the suit was improperly dismissed and
that the previous motion for summary judgment had been incorrect-
ly overruled. The defendant appealed. Held, reformed and affirmed:
A reviewing court can reverse and render judgment only when cross-
motions for summary judgment were made with one denied and the
other granted. In all other cases a denied motion for summary judg-
ment is not reviewable by an appellate court. Ackermann v. Vorden-
baum, 403 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1966).
II. DEVELOPMENT OF APPELLATE SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PROCEDURE IN TEXAS
Since the adoption in Texas of rule 166-A 3 in 1950, the courts
have consistently reiterated the stock phrase that "the denial of a
motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and no appeal will lie
therefrom." In 1954 the supreme court, by way of dicta in Wright
2 See TEX. R. Civ. P. 46, 49.
3TEx. R. CrV. P. 166-A became effective March 1, 1950. It was adopted with minor
textual changes from FED. R. Cv. P. 56. [See note 19 infra for FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)].
Following is TEX. R. Crv. P. 166-A § (a)-(c) with 1966 amendment effective January 1,
1967:
Summary Judgment
(a) For Claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
adverse party has appeared or answered, move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof.
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to amount of
damages.
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim,
or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any
time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in
his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and Proceedings Thereon. The motion shall be served at least
ten days before the time specified for the hearing. The adverse party prior to
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. No oral testimony shall be
received at the hearing. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judg-
ment as a matter of law.
4Some of the cases making this broad statement are: Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co.,
157 Tex. 304, 302 S.W.2d 938 (1957); Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670
(1955); Wyche v. Noah, 288 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; City of
S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref. n.r.e.; F. & T. Dev. Co. v. Morris, 248
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v. Wright,' did say that it might be convenient to allow appellate
courts to review the refusal of a motion for summary judgment and
then render the judgment that the trial court ought to have entered.
However, the court added that "since such a practice would be by
way of exception to a general rule, any benefits might well be out-
weighed by the resultant confusion"' since this would be allowing an
appeal from an interlocutory decision. Without considering its prior
dicta in the Wright case, the supreme court in 1957 reaffirmed the
prior position that a denied motion for summary judgment afforded
no basis for the reviewing court to render judgment for the movant'
The break from the consistently applied rule of nonappealability
came in 1958. In Tobin v. Garcia' the supreme court again stated that
a single denied motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and is
not reviewable on appeal from a later final judgment; but it held
that when there are cross-motions for summary judgment and one is
granted, the denied motion becomes final and reviewable on appeal.
The court relied on rule 434' as authority to allow the appellate court
to render judgment, rendition being allowed under that rule unless
"it is necessary that some matter of fact be ascertained." The court
followed Tobin v. Garcia in 1959 in Gulf, Colorado &. Santa Fe Ry. v.
McBride."0 This was also a case of cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, but dicta in the case indicated that judgment might be ren-
dered based on a prior denied motion for summary judgment fol-
lowed by any final judgment." In 1960 the supreme court in another
case involving the granting of one of two opposing motions for sum-
mary judgment, citing Tobin v. Garcia and McBride, reversed and
rendered judgment, reiterating the reasoning of Tobin that, since "ad-
mittedly there are no facts in dispute . . . ,,12 the court as author-
ized to render the judgment that the trial court should have entered."
San Antonio v. Crane, 275 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Dyche v. Simmons, 264
S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952); Mellette v. Hudstan Oil Corp., 243 S.W.2d 438 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
5154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
'Id. at 674.
7Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co., 157 Tex. 304, 302 S.W.2d 938 (1957).
8 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396 (1958). Tobin v. Garcia was noted in 4 So. Trx. L.J.
298 (1959), and the author there concluded that the gap in the Texas summary judgment
system was closed by Tobin. The instant problem of a denied motion for summary judgment
followed by a final judgment was not mentioned.
'See TEX. R. Civ. P. 434.
0 159 Tex. 442, 322 S.W.2d 492 (1959).
" For a general discussion of McBride and its potential effect, see also Note, 16 OKLA.
L. REv. 335 (1963).
"Catholic Charities v. Harper, 161 Tex. 21, 337 S.W.2d 111 (1960).
"See also Dallas Teachers Credit Union v. Sweeney, 326 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Civ. App.
1959) error dism., where the court considered an appeal from a denied cross-motion for
summary judgment but remanded since an issue of fact existed.
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III. ANALYSIS OF ACKERMANN
Ackermann v. Vordenbaum limits the possible extension of Tobin
v. Garcia implied in McBride and definitely establishes the rule that
rendition of judgment can be granted by an appellate court only
where cross-motions for summary judgment were presented in the
trial court. The supreme court stated that any other view of the rule
"could result in judgments which would be patently unjust."'' The
court reasoned that when there are cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, both parties are saying that only an issue of law is present to
be decided. While the existence of cross-motions alone does not
insure that there is no fact issue, it does indicate that both parties are
mainly concerned with the interpretations of law and that "they are
prepared to present their respective contentions with reference [to
the law]."" On the other hand, when a single motion for summary
judgment is made, the party responding to the motion is endeavor-
ing to establish, through affidavits and depositions, that an issue of
fact does exist. Moreover, the court feared that the response to the
motion might not disclose all the pertinent facts since "generally, the
facts are more fully developed upon a conventional trial than they are
by affidavits and depositions relied upon to support or defeat a mo-
tion for summary judgment."'
While the Texas courts may review a denied motion for summary
judgment in the cases where cross-motions are made with one granted
and one denied,' the courts must flatly refuse to review any single
denied motion for summary judgment, even after the case has pro-
ceeded to a final judgment in the trial court. The only proper pro-
cedural step after reversal is to remand to the trial court for further
action. The requirement of remanding is to be applied without ref-
erence to the existence or non-existence of a genuine issue of fact in
the case before the appellate court.
IV. FEDERAL RULE OF APPEALABILITY
When deciding cases concerning summary judgment under Texas
rule 166-A," if there are no Texas cases in point, the Texas courts
14403 S.W.Zd 362 at 365.
," Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 It is interesting to note that in 1961 the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Southern
Lloyds v. Jones, 345 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), completely overlooked Tobin and
stated that it could not reverse and render on cross-motions for a summary judgment, citing
Rogers v. Royalty Pooling Co. (supra note 7) as authority when, in fact, Rogers had been
overruled by Tobin more than three years earlier.
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often find precedent in federal cases arising under federal rule 56"9
(from which the Texas rule is adopted). In fact, in Dunn v. Tillman'
a court of civil appeals quoted both the Texas and the federal rules
in their entirety to show their substantial, if not literal, identity be-
fore deciding the case on the basis of prior federal decisions. In
Wright v. Wright"' the supreme court cited federal cases saying, "we
see no good reason to take a different view for our own practice,
which derives from the Federal Rules." 2 For this reason, even though
no federal cases were mentioned in arriving at the Ackermann deci-
sion, it is pertinent to examine federal decisions in point before draw-
ing conclusions as to the propriety of this new Texas rule for appel-
late review of a denied motion for summary judgment.
Denial of a motion for summary judgment can be based either on
the existence of an issue of fact or on the application of the sub-
stantive law to the uncontested facts. 3 In either case the denial is
interlocutory, and the case remains for trial. In federal appellate
courts the order of denial is not immediately appealable"M unless spe-
cifically made appealable by rule or statute.' For example, immed-
iate appealability exists when the action involves multiple claims or
multiple parties and the court enters the proper orders under rule
54 (b)'" or when the action fits within the interlocutory appeal situa-
tions enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1292.' The rule of non-appealability
Is TEx. R. Cxv. P. 166-A; see note 3 supra.
'
9 FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Specifically rule 56(c), provides:
The motion shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affi-
davits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue
of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
2°255 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
21154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
22 Id. at 674. Specifically the court relied on Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage
Co., 178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949) and Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F.2d
123 (5th Cir. 1939).
23 See 6 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 5 56 (2d ed. 1965) (hereinafter cited as 6 MooRE)
for a general use of summary judgment. See also McDonald, Effective Use of Summary
judgment, 15 Sw. L.J. 365 (1961); and 3 BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1231 (Wright ed. 1958) (hereinafter cited as 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF).
24 6 MOORE 5 56.27.
2'Id. at 56.20(1).
asFED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). See discussion of rule 54(b) at 6 MOORE 56.21 (1) and
3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 1241.
2 Interlocutory appeals are allowed under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1948) as of right in
four situations: (1) interlocutory orders involving injunctions; (2) interlocutory orders
appointing a receiver; (3) orders determining rights and liabilities in admiralty cases; and
(4) judgments in civil actions for patent infringement which are final except for account-
[Vol. 20
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of a denied motion for summary judgment had been applied consist-
ently since the promulgation of rule 56, but the definition of non-
appealability means only not immediately appealable." It has no ref-
erence to whether or not the denial is reviewable when a final judg-
ment in the case is before a higher court.
Texas courts have adopted from the federal practice the idea of
non-appealability of a denied motion for summary judgment but have
not accepted the modification promulgated by the federal courts that
this denial remains interlocutory with other orders of the trial court
only until there is a final judgment in the trial court.
While there is no federal case discussing exactly the same pro-
cedural problems as those in Ackermann, the distinction between the
narrow use of summary judgment in Texas as opposed to the much
broader use in federal courts can be seen from the holdings and dicta
of similar situations in federal cases. These cases demonstrate not only
the ability of a federal appellate court to reverse and render sum-
mary judgment but, more importantly, the guidelines followed in
determining the propriety of rendering judgment. When federal courts
decline to render judgment based on an earlier denied motion for
summary judgment, they do so for one of two primary reasons. First,
a genuine issue as to a material fact may clearly exist. To reverse and
render judgment rather than to remand here would be to go against
the express mandate of rule 56(c). Secondly, the parties may not
have been given an opportunity to establish the existence of a gen-
uine issue of material fact. To render judgment in this situation would
possibly be to deny the losing party a jury trial on an issue of fact.
There is no federal principle similar to the Texas principle that a
single denied motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on
appeal per se.
United States v. Fremont County9 was one of the earliest federal
cases where the appellate court rendered judgment based on a denied
motion for summary judgment. The trial court, after overruling the
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, dismissed the plaintiff's
cause of action on the merits.2 " Without discussing rule 56, the court
ing. Permissive appeal is also possible under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1948) from an inter-
locutory order. Generally see 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF § 1242.28 See rule 56, note 19 supra. The consistency of the federal courts in refusing an immedi-
ate appeal of a denied motion for summary judgment can be seen in the following sample
of cases: Valdosta Livestock Co. v. Williams, 316 F.2d 188 (4th Cir. 1963); Burleson v.
Canada, 285 F.2d 264 (4th Cir. 1961); Atlantic Co. v. Citizens Ice & Cold Storage Co.,
178 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1949); Jones v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 123 (5th
Cir. 1939).
29145 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 804 (1945).
" United States v. Fremont County, 53 F. Supp. 395 (D. Wyo. 1943).
1966]
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of appeals found that there were no controverted material fact issues
and reversed and rendered judgment for the plaintiff." Perhaps the
lack of discussion was because clearly all the facts were before the
court, and, since they were uncontested, there was no need to remand
for a trial court to decide issues of fact. It was certainly more expedi-
tious for the appellate court to apply the law to the facts presented
than to remand for that same purpose.
The Supreme Court in 1948 decided Fountain v. Filson3 which has
become the leading federal case setting out criteria limiting the power
of an appellate court to render summary judgment. The defendant
won in the trial court. The court of appeals reviewed the trial court
findings of fact and made out a new cause of action for plaintiff
which he had not previously pleaded. Having thus found a claim
which apparently entitled plaintiff to win, the court ordered sum-
mary judgment entered accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded because the verdict of the court of appeals was based on
a theory not presented to the trial court." The Court stated that nor-
mally there would be no question of the propriety of granting sum-
mary judgment by the appellate court, but here the defendant would
have been denied an opportunity to present her case with respect to
the new claim found by the court of appeals. The defendant might
have been able to present a triable issue of fact concerning this new
claim. The Court indicated that if the plaintiff had presented this
claim in the trial court, it would have been procedurally correct for
the appellate court to reverse and render summary judgment for
plaintiff. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op.,' decided by the Supreme
Court in 1958, restated that rendition will not be allowed when the
losing party would be denied the right to a jury trial on an issue of
fact. In that case the court of appeals held that a previously dis-
allowed affirmative defense was good and, after applying the law to
" Note that federal appellate courts usually do not reverse and render per se but rather
reverse and remand with instructions to enter judgment as directed. For the purpose of this
Note the procedure will be referred to as "reverse and render" in order to use Texas termi-
nology for comparison between federal and Texas cases.
32 3 3 6 U.S. 681 (1949).
a" Id. at 683. Specifically the Court said that:
Summary judgment may be given, under Rule 56, only if there is no dispute
as to any material fact. There was no occasion in the trial court for Mrs.
Fountain to dispute the facts material to a claim that a personal obligation
existed, since the only claim considered by that court on her motion for sum-
mary judgment was the claim that there was a resulting trust. When the Court
of Appeals concluded that the trial court should have considered a claim for
personal judgment it was error for it to deprive Mrs. Fountain of an oppor-
tunity to dispute the facts material to that claim by ordering summary judg-
ment against her.
34356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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the situation then presented, reversed and rendered summary judg-
ment for defendant. The Supreme Court ordered the case remanded
since the plaintiff had not been given an opportunity to develop the
facts concerning the affirmative defense, allowed for the first time on
appeal. Both the Fountain and Byrd cases show that summary judg-
ment should not be granted by an appellate court in the area where
judgment could be based on facts or issues not previously presented to
a trial court.
The District of Columbia Circuit seemed to add a limitation to
the power of an appellate court to render summary judgment in 1950.
In that case," the court declined to render judgment because the
factual issues had not been sufficiently developed in the trial court.
Actually, the court declined to render judgment since it was not
clear that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact, as re-
quired by rule 56 before summary judgment can be rendered. In
fact, the same court in 1957 reaffirmed'0 the federal position that an
appellate court has the power to reverse and render judgment in ac-
cord with the incorrectly denied motion for summary judgment,
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
The existence of a properly admissible question of fact was, in
effect, held to be the criterion for remand by the Supreme Court in
1963. That Court in Florida Avocado Growers v. Paul" held that it
did not have the power to reverse and render a decision and that it
could only reverse and remand, since on the record presented to the
Court there was a conflict between the appellee and the appellant as
to what constituted the admitted evidence in the case. In other words,
the Court looked to the record and determined that a genuine issue
of fact did exist." Even though the defendant did not move for a
summary judgment in the trial court, the Second Circuit in the 1962
case of Procter & Gamble Ind. Union v. Procter &4 Gamble Mfg. Co."
held that since no genuine controversy on the facts existed, it had the
power to grant summary judgment for the defendant, loser in the
trial court. The plaintiff had sued to compel the defendant to arbi-
'Elder v. Brannan, 184 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
'Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
37 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
38 Id. at 156. Specifically the Court stated:
[to reverse and render judgment] would be, in effect, to admit the contested
depositions and exhibits on appeal without ever affording the appellees an oppor-
tunity to argue their seemingly substantial objections. To assume the admis-
sibility of the evidence under these circumstances would be to deny the ap-
pellees their day in court as to a disputed part of the case on which the trial
court has never ruled because its view of the law evidently made such a ruling
unnecessary.
39312 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 830 (1963).
NOTES1966]
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trate certain grievances and had moved for a summary judgment.
The trial court found no express contractual duty to arbitrate, but
it held that the existing employee-employer relation did create such
a duty and thus granted the motion for summary judgment. The
court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the defendant,
holding that the duty to arbitrate could exist only by virtue of a con-
tract. In a later Second Circuit case" the court of appeals reversed
the plaintiff's summary judgment and dismissed the case as the de-
fendant had requested earlier in the trial court.4 The plaintiff's at-
torney neither maintained that all the facts were not before the court
nor alleged that facts warranting a different decision would be al-
leged or proved. The court stated, "under these circumstances, we
perceive no reason for not bringing this litigation to an end."42
V. CONCLUSION
The entire line of federal appellate cases decided by the Supreme
Court and followed by the lower courts which discuss denying or
granting the motion for summary judgment turn on the existence or
nonexistence of a genuine issue of fact.4" The federal cases do not state
that a denied motion for summary judgment is not reviewable on ap-
peal, but rather that denial is not immediately appealable because of its
interlocutory character, except in certain instances." In fact, the fed-
eral appellate courts do not require that the party deserving of the
summary judgment must have made such a motion at the trial level.
They require only that on the record presented there is to be no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and that the party deserving the judg-
ment is entitled to it as a matter of law. As stated by the Third Cir-
cuit, "Since the record made below fairly presents the issue as to
whether [the parties] are entitled to summary judgments, judicial
economy will patently be served by an immediate determination of
this issue rather than remanding these cases to the District Court for
disposition.""
'°Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965).
"' Plaintiff had moved for a dismissal in the trial court under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6),
"for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,"
4'348 F.2d 999 at 1002.
4' Federal district court cases since Hooker v. New York Life Ins. Co., 66 F. Supp. 313
(N.D. Il. 1946), have consistently held that a trial court cross-motion for summary judg-
ment is not needed in order for the trial or appellate court to grant the summary judgment
to the party entitled to it. For typical cases to date following Hooker, see Smith v. McDonald,
116 F. Supp. 158 (M.D. Pa. 1953); St. Louis Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Witney, 96 F.
Supp. 55 (M.D. Pa. 1951); Roman v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 9 F.R.D. 49 (D.P.R. 1949).
44 See note 27 supra.




The fear expressed by the Texas Supreme Court in Ackermann v.
Vordenbaum" (and used as a reason for their decision setting up the
Texas rule) was that injustice would result because factual issues
which might have developed after denial of the motion would be
disregarded by rendering judgment. The federal approach insures
remand for jury trials only where factual issues do exist. If there are
no factual issues before the federal appellate court, it will not auto-
matically remand; rather, it will grant a summary judgment allow-
ing an early end to useless litigation.
In both judicial systems, to obtain a summary judgment in a trial
court, the movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issue
of fact exists-and his position must be established to such a high
degree of probability that the judge is convinced that further trial
would be useless formality. In Texas the opponent of the motion
generally need make no defense to the motion until this has been
done.4 Even then he need only show a suspicion that an issue of fact
exists."8 Since under the current Texas interpretation of the summary
judgment rule the showing of the existence of an issue of fact can be
so slight and still be sufficient to defeat the motion, an appellate court
should have authority to render judgment if an opponent carelessly
fails to defend sufficiently.
A denial of a motion for summary judgment followed by a final
judgment of the trial court, either (1) by the granting of a cross-
motion for summary judgment, (2) by a judgment on the merits
after a full trial, or (3) by a dismissal on the merits before trial (as
in Ackermann) is no longer interlocutory and should be a proper
subject for review by an appellate court. If the court finds that no
factual issues exist or are claimed to exist,4 the court of civil appeals
should have the authority under rule 4340 (or the supreme court
under rules 501, 502, and 505") to reverse and render the judgment
that would be rendered inevitably by the trial court on remand. Such
a practice would lend strength to summary judgment procedure in
48403 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1966).
" For a discussion of the defenses necessary against a motion for summary judgment see
Bauman, Summary Judgment: The Texas Experience, 31 TEXAS L. REv. 866 (1953).
48 For the small amount of defense necessary to defeat a motion for summary judgment
in Texas, see Penn v. Garabed Gulbenkian, 243 S.W.2d 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951), aff'd,
252 S.W.2d 929 (1952), where defendant successfully contested plaintiff's motion for sum-
mary judgment by affidavits which merely repeated his pleadings. See also De La Garza v.
Ryals, 239 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) error ref. n.r.e., where a motion for sum-
mary judgment was denied because defendant's pleading and affidavits were sufficient to raise
an issue of fact, the affidavit saying that defendant "would show the court ..
48 See note 48 supra.
ao TEx. R. Cirv. P. 434.
" TEx. R. Cv. P. 501-02, 505.
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Texas, reinstate the prior Texas approach of looking to federal cases
for precedent on summary judgment, and provide an expeditious end
to useless litigation.
Marcus Leslie Thompson
